This article introduces the concept of ‘strategic identity’ as a bridge between the indigenous peoples’ struggle for self-determination and their search for solidarity in the context of globalization, with a focus on the Lumads, or indigenous peoples in southern Philippines. The paper begins with an encounter with a global actor affecting a local community. We realize the impact of powerful, well-networked forces that challenge even the operation of the state. Without trivializing the threats associated with this model of globalization, we (...) also insist that a realistic and hopeful approach may emerge if we acknowledge the many ‘selves’ in the indigenous peoples’ self-determination. At the heart of this proposal is a matrix that unpacks the complex ways that local, national, sectoral, and global actors can engage in conflict or solidarity with these strategic identity assertions. Solidarity work, then, becomes diversified and strategized in response to the evolving multiple indigenous identities that modernity paradoxically both endangers and engenders. (shrink)

Lives of Sogdians in Medieval China. By Moritz Huber. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2020. Pp. xvi + 350.

The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly what is meant by the term “philosophy” as it occurs in such expressions as “philosophy of physics,” “philosophy of mathematics,” “philosophy of science” and the like. The discussion will be divided into three parts: the first will consider several distinct meanings of the term “philosophy;” the second will discuss one of these in some detail, namely, philosophy as analysis; the third will seek to answer an important question concerning the results of (...) philosophic analysis. (shrink)

My purpose in this brief paper is to consider the implications of a radically different computer architecure to some fundamental problems in the foundations of Cognitive Science. More exactly, I wish to consider the ramifications of the 'Gödel-Minds-Machines' controversy of the late 1960s on a dynamically changing computer architecture which, I venture to suggest, is going to revolutionize which 'functions' of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata. I will proceed on the presupposition that the (...) reader is familiar with some of the fundamentals of computational theory and mathematical logic. (shrink)

In this paper we interpret a characterization of the Gödel speed-up phenomenon as providing support for the ‘Nagel-Newman thesis’ that human theorem recognizers differ from mechanical theorem recognizers in that the former do not seem to be limited by Gödel's incompleteness theorems whereas the latter do seem to be thus limited. However, we also maintain that (currently non-existent) programs which are open systems in that they continuously interact with, and are thus inseparable from, their environment, are not covered by the (...) above (or probably any other recursion-theoretic) argument. (shrink)